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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Nature of the Case and Background.

This case concerns a slip and fall accident that occuned at the Best Western Cottontree
Inn, located at 900 Lindsay Boulevard in Idaho Falls, Idaho, on July 10, 2012. Geralyn Gallagher
filed her lawsuit on July 9, 2014. Prior to filing her lawsuit, Ms. Gallagher's only attempt to
ascertain the owner of the subject hotel was a search of on the Idaho Secretary of State's website.
Relying solely on the Secretary of State's online information, the lawsuit originally named the
wrong defendant, the previous owner of the hotel, L & L Legacy Limited Partnership ("L & L
Legacy").
Approximately two years and nine months after the accident, Ms. Gallagher amended her
Complaint to name Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC ("Snake River"), the owner of the
hotel at the time of the accident, as a defendant. Service of the Amended Complaint, nine months
after the two-year statute of limitations had expired, was the first notice Snake River had of the
claim or the lawsuit. Consequently, the Amended Complaint served to Snake River does not
relate back to the filing of the original Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(c).
Ms. Gallagher asserts that the Amended Complaint, served nine months too late, should
relate back, and that the limitations period should be tolled because of her "reliance" upon the
information found on the Idaho Secretary of State's website. However, applying the plain
language of I.R.C.P. 15(c), the District Court dismissed Ms. Gallagher's Amended Complaint as
not relating back because Snake River was served nine months after the statute of limitations had
run. It also conectly concluded that Idaho law requires a plaintiff to do more to discover the
proper party than a simple search of the Secretary of State's website. There is no justification for
tolling the statute of limitations in this case.

B. Course of Proceedings Below.
On July 9, 2014, Ms. Gallagher filed a Verified Complaint for Damages and Demand for
Jury Trial against Best \Vestem Cottontree Inn and L & L Legacy. (R. pp. 6-10). In December of
2014, Ms. Gallagher attempted to serve the Idaho registered agent for L & L Legacy, attorney
Scott Eskelson, who refused service and informed Plaintiff that the business had been sold. (R.
pp. 10-14). Weeks later, on January 8, 2015, Ms. Gallagher filed a Motion to Extend Time for
Service of Plaintiffs Complaint and Summons and Affidavit of Allen H. Browning. (R. pp. 1014). On January 14, 2015, the Court entered an Order to Extend Time for Service ninety days,
until April 14, 2015. (R. pp. 19-20). Ms. Gallagher's Amended Complaint and Summons was
filed by Plaintiff on April 9, 2015 and served upon Best Western Cottontree Inn and Snake River
on April 13, 2015. (R. pp. 23-27, 35). Snake River filed a Notice of Appearance on April 27,
2015 (R. p. 2). The parties filed a Stipulation for Dismissal of L & L Legacy on May 19, 2015.
(R. pp. 38-39). On June 4, 2015, the Court entered an Order for Dismissal of L & L Legacy
Partnership, LLC With Prejudice. (R. p. 59).
On May 21, 2015, Snake River filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support
that requested dismissal based on Ms. Gallagher's untimely service and because Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint did not relate back to the original filing date pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(c). (R.
pp. 46-55). On June 5, 2015, Ms. Gallagher filed an objection to Snake River's motion. Snake
River filed its Reply Brief on June 19, 2015. (R. pp. 61-78). Following oral argument on June 23,
the Court granted Snake River's motion and dismissed Snake River with prejudice. (R pp. 7987). Ms. Gallagher filed a Motion to Reconsider on July 10, 2015. (R. pp. 88-89). Ms. Gallagher
filed no brief in support of the motion. (R. pp. 93-98). Snake River filed its Opposition to Ms.
Gallagher's Motion to Reconsider on August 31, 2015. (R. pp. 90-92). The Court held a hearing

2

on Ms. Gallagher's Motion to Reconsider on September 8, 2015. Following oral argument, the
Court allowed Snake River time for additional briefing before issuing a ruling because Ms.
Gallagher had failed to file a brief outlining the arguments she later presented at oral argument.
Snake River's supplemental brief opposing Ms. Gallagher's Motion for Reconsideration was
filed September 15, 2015. (R. pp. 93-98). Ms. Gallagher "responded" to Snake River's
Supplemental Brief on September 21, 2015. Snake River/Best Western filed a reply to Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental Brief on September 24, 2015. (R. pp. 99-107). On
September 28, 2015, the Court entered its Decision and Order, denying Ms. Gallagher's Motion
to Reconsider. Ms. Gallagher appealed.

C. Statement of Material Facts.
This case concerns a slip and fall accident that occurred at the Best Western Cottontree
Inn, located at 900 Lindsay Boulevard in Idaho Falls, Idaho, on July 10, 2012. (R. p. 24).
Geralyn Gallagher hired Allen Browning to pursue her injury claim.
On July 9, 2014, one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired, Ms.
Gallagher filed a lawsuit alleging that she fell on a wet floor located in the Best Western
Cottontree Inn in Idaho Falls on July 10, 2012. (R. p. 7). The Complaint named Best Western
Cottontree Inn and L & L Legacy, the alleged owner and operator of the hotel, as defendants. (R.

p. 6).
Prior to filing the lawsuit, Ms. Gallagher's only attempt to ascertain the owner of the
subject hotel was a search on the Idaho Secretary of State website. (R. pp. 13-18). The Complaint
relied entirely upon the Secretary of State's online information, which provided no address or
location for the hotel. (R. p. 6-9, 13-18). Due to Ms. Gallagher's failure to reasonably investigate
the identity of the owner, her Complaint named the wrong defendant. (R. pp. 6-9, 13-18).
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December of 201

near the end of the six-month service deadline, Ms. Gallagher

attempted to serve the Idaho registered agent for L & L Legacy, attorney Scott Eskelson, but he
refused to accept service. (R. p. 11). Ms. Gallagher's agent was told by Scott Eskelson at that
time that Snake River was the owner of the hotel and that James Spatig was the registered agent
for Snake River (R.p. 14). On January 8, 2015, one dav before the six-month time limit for
service under I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) expired, Ms. Gallagher filed a Motion to Extend Time for Service
of Plaintiffs Complaint and Summons. (R. p. 11-12). The alleged basis for the motion was that
when Ms. Gallagher attempted to serve the registered agent for L&L Legacy, she was informed
that the business had been sold. Ms. Gallagher asserted that she needed more time to research
who owned the business and the property at the time of the incident. (R. p. 11 ). However,
Plaintiff admits to being previously told by Scott Eskelson in December 2014 that Snake River
owned the hotel and that the registered agent was James Spatig. (R.p.14). At that time, two and a
half years had passed since the subject accident.
The Affidavit of Counsel in support of the motion represented that an attempt to serve L
& L Legacy's agent was unsuccessful because the Best Western Cottontree Inn was no longer
owned by L & L Legacy. (R. p. 14). The Affidavit of Counsel also admitted that efforts to locate
the owner of the Best Western Cottontree Inn had consisted only of a web search of the Idaho
Secretary of State's webpage. (R. pp. 13-18). On January 14, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff a
90-day extension for service. (R. p. 19).
On April 9, 2015, five days before the 90-day extension expired, and two years and nine
months after the date of the subject accident, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Summons
were, for the first time, filed and served upon Snake River, the owner and operator of the subject
Best Western Cottontree Inn. (R. pp. 21-22). Plaintiffs Amended Complaint correctly alleged
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that at all relevant times, Snake River was the O\\;Tier and operator of the Best Western Cottontree
Inn, and the owner of the property upon which the hotel is located, in Idaho Falls. (R. pp. 23-24).
On May 19, 2015, the parties stipulated to dismiss L & L Legacy from the lawsuit as it
had been sufficiently demonstrated that Snake River had purchased the hotel prior to Ms.
Gallagher's accident. (R. pp. 38-39).

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
A. Geralyn Gallagher's Amended Complaint naming Snake River does not relate back to

the time of the filing of the original Complaint.
B. Snake River's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho
Secretary of State's Office does not toll the two-year statute of limitations.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews a grant of summary judgment, it does so under

the same standard employed by the District Court. Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147
Idaho 774, 779, 215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." Id. (quoting Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
When a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence
indicating the absence of material fact issues, the opposing party's case must not rest on mere
speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact.

McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation
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119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991). The question is whether a genuine

of

fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v.

Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). If the undisputed
facts before the court indicate that summary judgment is appropriate, judgment should be entered
as a matter oflaw. Id.

IV.

ARGUMENT.
A. Geralyn Gallagher's Amended Complaint naming Snake River does not relate
back to the time of the filing of her original Complaint.
Geralyn Gallagher amended her Complaint to name Snake River as the owner and

operator of the subject Best Western nine months after the two-year personal injury statute of
limitations 1 had expired on July 10, 2014. Consequently, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)
governs the outcome in this issue. The pertinent provisions of LC.RP. 15(c) provide as follows:

An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against the paiiy.
LR.C.P. 15(c). (Emphasis added.)
In Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 729-730 (Idaho 2008), this Court decided an issue
nearly identical to the one presented in this case:
Winn filed her complaint against Wayne Campbell, dba Home Hotel and
Motel. However, the location where Winn fell was not the Home Hotel; instead, it
was the Tumbling Waters Motel. Both hotels, although owned by separate parties,
are operated by Campbell, Inc., not by Wayne Campbell personally. Winn does
not dispute that she filed her original complaint against the wrong party. Instead,

1

This is a claim for personal injuries. The statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. LC. § 5-219.
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she alleges that the District Court interpreted the relation-back
and that justice demands she be allowed to amend her complaint.

too narrowly,

At issue is Idaho R. Civ. P. 15(c), the relation-back rule. This Court has
described the rule as follows: [A]n amendment changing the party against whom a
claim is asserted will relate back to the date of the original pleading if: (a) the
claim arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set fo1ih or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading; (b) within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against the new partv, he received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on
the merits; and (c) within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against the new party, he knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against him, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 794-95, 41 P.3d 220, 222-23
(2001 ). Winn contends that the District Court gave a strict and narrow reading to
the rule that would require an "absolute finding of 'undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment' every time the party
to be included was not notified of the actual filing of the Complaint within the
applicable statutory limitation period." Winn's argument, however, is without
merit.
The issue in Wait was whether the defendant received notice within the
period provided by law for commencing the action. In a situation similar to the
one at bar, the plaintiff failed to name the correct party in her complaint, naming
instead a corporation with a name similar to that of the correct party. The plaintiff
argued that the period provided by law for commencing an action included the
six-month period within which a summons must be served after a complaint is
filed. Id. at 795, 41 P.3d at 223. The Court disagreed. It held, "The phrase 'within
the period provided by law for commencing the action' means before the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations." Id. (citing Hoopes v. Deere &
Co., 117 Idaho 386, 788 P.2d 201 (1990)). The Court explained that Hoopes
"expressly rejected" the argument that "the period provided by law for
commencing the action" meant the time within which the summons and complaint
must be served. Id. The Court stated plainly that a civil action is commenced by
the filing of a complaint-not by service of process. Thus, the Court held that the
plaintiffs amended complaint did not avoid the statute of limitations because it
could not relate back to the original filing.
Winn offers no reason why the plain language of the rule should not apply
in her case. Instead, she argues that Campbell, Inc. was not prejudiced by her
failure to name it as a party in a timely manner. The district court held that Rule
15(c) does not mandate that Campbell, Inc. demonstrate prejudice. Instead, it
focused on the fact that Winn failed to give notice to the proper party within the
statutory limitations period. The court noted that Campbell, Inc. received notice of
the institution of the lawsuit on July 10, 2006, nearly six months after the statute
of limitations had expired. Further, the court held that failure to provide notice is
7

sufficient to show that the party would be prejudiced in maintaining its defense.
Since we review this issue under an abuse of discretion standard, the fact that the
district court wrote a reasoned opinion on the issue is sufficient for us to uphold
its decision. Furthermore, this is the correct result.
Wim1 failed to make a proper investigation of whom to sue. Her fall
occurred at the Tumbling Waters Motel, not the Home Hotel. Had Winn bothered
to determine where she was actually staying or to find out who operated the
Tumbling Waters Motel in 2004, she likely could have discovered the proper
party to sue. Instead, her attorney acted on information from prior dealings he had
with Campbell and the Tumbling Waters Motel and a brief conversation he had
with Campbell in the beginning of 2006. However, the record does not show that
Campbell, Inc. received notice of the suit before the statute of limitations expired.
In Noreen v. Price Dev. Co. Ltd. P'ship, 135 Idaho 816, 25 P.3d 129
(Ct.App.2001), the Court of Appeals held that a complaint could not relate back
where service occurred only one day after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at
819, 25 P.3d at 132. Here, Winn failed to provide notice to Campbell personally
until nearly six months after the statute of limitations ran. Even if notice to
Campbell in his personal capacity was sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements
for Campbell, Inc., the fact remains that Campbell, Inc. did not receive notice of
the lawsuit within the limitations period. Thus, Winn's amendment could not have
related back and the district court properly denied the motion to amend.
Id. (Emphasis added.)

The same result was reached by the District Court in our case and should now be
affirmed by this Court. Ms. Gallagher filed her suit against the wrong party. It is apparent that, as
in Winn, Ms. Gallagher failed to make a reasonable and proper investigation of whom to sue.
The correct party, Snake River, the owner and operator of Best \Vestem Cottontree Inn in Idaho
Falls, did not receive notice of the claim or suit until April 9, 2015, nine months after the statute
of limitations had expired on July 10, 2014, and two years and nine months after the subject
accident.

Because Snake River did not receive notice of the lawsuit before the statute of

limitations expired, under I.R.C.P. 15(c), the result must be that the amendment does not relate
back, and the lawsuit is barred by the two-year personal injury statute of limitations.
In Hoopes v. Deere & Co., 117 Idaho 386,389 (Idaho 1990), this Court stated:
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3
2
Consequently, Schiavone and Chacon show that, under amended Rule
15(c), the newly named party must receive notice of the commencement of the
action before the statute of limitations runs. This applies where the defendant's
name is corrected as well as where the defendant's identity is not initially known.

(Emphasis added.)
There is no dispute on the material facts in this case. Snake River did not receive notice
of Ms. Gallagher's lawsuit before the two-year statute oflimitations expired on July 10, 2014. In
fact, Snake River did not receive notice until nine months after the statute of limitations had
expired. The Amended Complaint naming Snake River, the owner and operator of the Best
Western, as a defendant does not relate back and is barred by the two-year personal injury statute
of limitations.
B. Snake River's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name with the
Idaho Secretary of State's office does not toll the two-year statute of limitations.
Ms. Gallagher argues that the statute of limitations controversy in this case centers on the
legal effect of the prior owner, L & L Limited Legacy, remaining listed as the business owner
with the Idaho Secretary of State. (R. p. 65). While, in dicta, the Winn Court acknowledged the
possibility of tolling a statute of limitations under circumstances the Court had not yet
encountered, Winn and then Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 527
(2012), decided four years after Winn, make it clear that the first step in the analysis is to
4
determine whether a plaintiff used reasonable diligence in ascertaining the correct party to sue.

See Winn, 145 Idaho at 731; Ketterling, 152 Idaho at 560. The level of due diligence required by
a plaintiff to ascertain a business owner, as outlined in Winn, is further analyzed in Ketterling.
2

Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986).
Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 723 P.2d 814 (1986).
4
Although Winn acknowledges that there is "some indication that tolling of the statute is possible," the Idaho Court
of Appeals found otherwise, stating that '"[t]he only remedies or consequences of noncompliance prescribed in the
Act itself are those provided in§ 53-509.' Noreen v. Price Dev. Co. ?'ship, 135 Idaho 816,821, 25 P.3d 129, 134
(Ct. App. 2001). Further, it held that '[t]olling of the statute of limitation on a claim against a noncomplying
business is not a remedy provided by the legislation."' Winn, 145 Idaho at 731 citing Noreen v. Price Dev. Co.
P'ship, 135 Idaho 816,820, 25 P.3d 129, 133 (Ct. App. 2001).
3
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In Ketterling, a customer brought a negligence action against Burger King for injuries
sustained when she slipped on snow in a restaurant parking lot. 152 Idaho at 556. The plaintiff
originally filed the lawsuit against Burger King Corporation within the two-year limitations
period. Id. The plaintiff had searched the Idaho Secretary of State's records for the owner, but
because the franchisee never filed a certificate of assumed business name, the entity listed on the
website was Burger King Corporation. Id. at 559. At that point, the plaintiff discontinued her
search for the business owner. Id. After the limitations period expired, the plaintiff learned the
identity of the franchisee and amended her complaint to include the franchisee. Id at 556. This
Court affirmed the District Court's finding that the amended complaint did not relate back
because the franchisee was not provided with notice of the lawsuit until over a month after the
period provided by law for commencing the action had expired. Id. at 558. (Emphasis added.)
This Court also affinned the District Court's refusal to toll the limitations period for the
franchisee's failure to register an assumed business name for the restaurant. Id. at 560. The
plaintiff in Ketterling attempted to differentiate her situation from that of Winn, stating that she
had done her due diligence by checking with the Idaho Secretary of State, but this Court
disagreed, stating:
Ketterling is correct that this is not a situation in which she
"fail[ed] to take the simple step of finding out where she fell."
Ketterling had the right place, but she still failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in figuring out who to sue. Ketterling's search
of the Secretary of State's records was reasonable, but she clearly
could have done more. There is no indication in the record that
she visited the restaurant prior to the end of the limitations period
to find out who was responsible for operation of the establishment.
Like the situation in a criminal investigation, where some of the
best clues are found at the scene of the crime, often evidence
relevant to a personal injury action can be found at the scene of the
accident.
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Ketterling, 152 Idaho at 560. (Emphasis added.)

addition to visiting the restaurant to

detennine who was responsible for its operation, this Court suggested another method the
plaintiff should have pursued to determine the identity of the business oVvner, stating:
First, Ketterling could have visited the restaurant before the statute
of limitations ran and simply asked an employee who was
responsible for operating the restaurant ... Second, she could have
contacted the health district to learn the identity of the restaurant
operator. There is no indication in the record that she did so.
Therefore, the district court was correct in concluding that the
identity and contact infonnation for [franchisee] was reasonably
available and ascertainable prior to the filing of the original
complaint.

Id. at 560-61. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the undisputed record established by Ms. Gallagher illustrates that the only
effort she undertook to locate the OVvner of the Best Western Cottontree Inn was a simple search
of the Idaho Secretary of State's webpage. (R. pp. 13-18). Ms. Gallagher does not state when that
web search occurred and/or explain why no further action was undertaken to determine the
owner/operator of the hotel and/or real property on which the hotel is located. As Idaho courts
have clearly stated, simply performing a search of the Secretary of State's database to determine
a defendant/party is inadequate, there must be a more comprehensive investigation. For example,
oftentimes a defendant business will lease property from another entity. In such a situation, a
mere search of the Secretary of State business filings would not provide a plaintiff with all
necessary potential defendant/parties, such as the landoVv'ller.
A reasonable search was not undertaken in this case. Despite living and working in Idaho
Falls, the location of the accident, Ms. Gallagher did not even visit the Best Western during the
two years following the accident to simply inquire as to who owned the business and/or property.
Further, in Ketterling, this Court noted that it is "common knowledge among the public" that in
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to operate a

a

from the health department is required, and that plaintiff

could have determined the owner by contacting the health department. Id. at 560. Similarly, for
our purposes, it is also common knowledge that ownership of all properties within a county's
borders are recorded with the county assessor's and/or recorder's office. Yet, Ms. Gallagher
makes no representations that she called or visited the Bonneville County Assessor's and/or
Recorder's Office to determine the owner of the subject property. As similarly explained in
Ketterling, the identity and contact information for the owner/operator of the Best Western

Cottontree Inn was reasonably available and ascertainable, and Ms. Gallagher's single attempt to
discover such information via a web search falls short of the level of due diligence required by
Idaho courts.
Ms. Gallagher asserts that this Court's decision in Ketterling does not apply to this case
because of a several alleged factual distinctions. Ms. Gallagher takes the liberty of attempting to
distinguish the cases based on alleged facts that do not exist in Ketterling. First, she contends
that the significant difference between the Ketterling case and this case is that, in Ketterling, "the
Defendant had not filed [with the Secretary of State], [so] there was no assumed name of record
5
which would have confused the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not inquire further." Appellant's

Brief, p. 10. Conversely, Ms. Gallagher asserts that she searched the Idaho Secretary of State's
website and found information indicating that L & L Legacy Limited Partnership owned and
operated the Best Western hotel. However, in Ketterling, this Court's decision states, "Ketterling
was unable to ascertain the name of any entity, besides Burger King Corporation, registered with
the Secretary of State to conduct business under the name 'Burger King."' 152 Idaho at 559. This
does not mean that there was no filing whatsoever, as Ms. Gallagher asserts. Rather, the plaintiff
5

Plaintiff's brief goes on to state that Ketterling "should not have merely assumed that a lack of any filing with the
Secretary of State meant the restaurant was owned by the larger corporation and not a franchisee." Plaintiff's Brief,
p. 11 (emphasis added).
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in Ketterling found on the Secretary of State's website that Burger King Corporation had
registered to do business as "Burger King" in the state of Idaho. There was no information
demonstrating that HB Boys was the owner/operator of the Burger King restaurant, because HB
Boys had not filed a certificate of assumed business name.
In this case, Ms. Gallagher found the same information on the Secretary of State's
website: that L & L Legacy Limited Partnerships had registered to do business in Idaho as Best
W estem Cottontree Inn. There was no infonnation demonstrating that Snake River was the
owner/operator of the Best Western Hotel, because Snake River had not yet filed a certificate of
assumed business name. The factual distinction asserted by Ms. Gallagher does not exist; Ms.
Gallagher found the same information on the website as the plaintiff in Ketterling.
In a further attempt to distinguish her case from Ketterling, Ms. Gallagher asserts
additional factual distinctions which are completely inaccurate and misstate the facts set forth in
the Ketterling decision and in the record before this Court. Specifically, Ms. Gallagher's brief
states the following:
The Ketterling case is quite different from Gallagher's
situation. Gallagher had the proper address for the place of injury,
and found that address listed in the official record on file with the
Idaho Secretary of State, and that it had been on file with that name
and address for many years prior to the accident, and was 'current'
as of the time of filing the complaint.
Appellant's Brief, p. 11. Ms. Gallagher's statement that she had the proper location of the injury
elicits an assumption that the plaintiff in Ketterling did not, which is false. In Ketterling, this
Court distinguished it from Winn by expressly stating "Ketterling is correct that this is not a
situation in which she 'fail[ed] to take the simple step of finding out where she fell.' Ketterling
had the right place, but she still failed to exercise reasonable diligence in figuring out who to
sue." Ketterling, 152 at 560 (emphasis added). Rather than distinguishing the two cases, this fact
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that both :t-v1s. Gallagher and Ketterling had the

their respective accidents, but failed to ascertain the proper owner of the

business.
Lastly, Ms. Gallagher argues that she "found the address [of the injury] listed in the
official record on file with the Idaho Secretary of State, and that it had been on file with that
name and address for many years." Appellant's Brief, p. 11. This statement is false. As
illustrated by Ms. Gallagher's own submissions, only the business address of L & L Legacy was
provided on the Secretary of State's website, not the address of the hotel (the site of the injury).
There is also no evidence that the address of the hotel had ever been listed, let alone for "many
years" as asserted by Ms. Gallagher's brief. Ms. Gallagher's assertion is simply not true. (R. pp.
15-18). Ms. Gallagher also states that L & L Legacy's information was "current." Appellant's
Brief, p. 11. Clearly, Ketterling presumed the Secretary of State's records were "current" and
relied upon their accuracy, just as Ms. Gallagher allegedly did. In Ketterling, this Court
established that while this was a reasonable first step, a plaintiff is responsible for bringing her
own lawsuit, which entails some minor, yet additional steps to ensure the correct parties are
included. As such, Ms. Gallagher's attempt to distance herself from the Ketterling case by
creating factual distinctions where none exist is illusory, and her arguments actually confirm the
glaring similarities between the two cases.
In summation, a review of the facts in Ketterling demonstrates that this case and the

Ketterling case are substantially similar and that the District Court correctly granted Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss based upon the Ketterling decision. The following is a brief highlight of the
pertinent similarities between this case and the Ketterling case:
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HB Boys, owner and operator of the
Burley Burger King restaurant, failed to
file a certificate of assumed business
name with the Idaho Secretary of State.
Plaintiff searches the Idaho Secretary of
State's records and finds the records for
Burger King Co1:12oration, doing
business as "Burger King" in Idaho.
Plaintiff contends that she could
ascertain no name besides Burger King
Corporation registered with the Idaho
Secretary of State's Office to conduct
business in Idaho under the name
"Burger King."
Plaintiff takes no further action to
investigate the identity of the owner
and/or operator of the Burley Burger
King restaurant, and files suit against
Burger King Corporation, as registered
with the Idaho Secretary of State's
Office.
Plaintiff later learns that the restaurant is
owned and operated by HB Boys and
attempts to amend her com12laint and
serve the lawsuit on HB Boys after the
ex12iration of the statute of limitations.

Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC, owner and
operator of Best Western Cottontree Inn at the time
of the subject accident, failed to file a certificate of
assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary
of State.
Plaintiff searches the Idaho Secretary of State's
records and finds the records for L&L Legacy
Limited PartnershiQ, doing business as "Best
Western Cottontree" Inn in Idaho.
Plaintiff contends that she could ascertain no name
besides L&L Legacy Limited PartnershiQ
registered with the Idaho Secretary of State's
Office to conduct business m Idaho as Best
Western Cottontree Inn.
Plaintiff takes no further action to investigate the
identity of the ovvner and/or operator of the Best
Western Cottontree Inn in Idaho Falls, and files
suit against L&L Legacy Limited Partnership,
LLC., as registered with the Idaho Secretary of
State's Office.
Approximately six months after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, Plaintiff learns that the
Best Western Cottontree Inn IS owned and
operated by Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC,
and amends her Comglaint and serves the
Defendant nine months after the expiration of the
statute of limitations.

As demonstrated above, there are no significant factual distinctions between the

Ketterling case and our case. Ms. Gallagher's assertion that factual distinctions exist based upon
the information found on the Secretary of State's website in each case is not supported by the
record.
Ultimately, Ms. Gallagher is asking this Court to ignore well-settled case law in an effort
to benefit plaintiff parties that fail to take diligent steps to ascertain parties' identities and adhere
to deadlines in a timely manner. Ms. Gallagher has attempted to present a unique case in order to
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offer this Court an opportunity to expand on the dicta found in Winn. However, this very
circun1stance was presented to this Court
Snake River engaged

Ketterling v. Burger King Corp. Like HB Boys,

no efforts to deceive Ms. Gallagher; it merely failed to file a certificate

of assumed business name with the Secretary of State following the acquisition of the business. It
would be inequitable to allow Ms. Gallagher a windfall at the expense of Snake River, when she
failed to initiate and prosecute her lawsuit in accordance with the plain language of the law.
Lawsuits are for the benefit of the plaintiff, and as such are commenced and driven forward
through their efforts. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff to take the reasonable steps necessary to
find the correct defendant party; in the cases of Winn and Ketterling, the Court outlined what
those steps are. Finding for Ms. Gallagher in this case and overturning the District Court's
decision would merely be rewarding Ms. Gallagher for failing to timely prosecute her claim.
Every deadline given to Ms. Gallagher in this case was pushed to the limit, demonstrating a clear
lack of diligence on the part of Ms. Gallagher. This lack of due diligence should not be rewarded.

V.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon the foregoing argument, the District Court was correct in determining that

Ms. Gallagher's Amended Complaint does not relate back and that the lawsuit should be
dismissed pursuant to the two-year personal injury statute of limitations. The District Court also
correctly determined that based upon the clear guidance of Ketterling, the undisputed facts in this
matter do not support a tolling of the statute of limitations based upon the Snake River's failure
to file a certificate of assumed business name. Snake River also seeks an award of its attorney
fees and costs incurred on appeal and asks that this Court render such other and further relief as it
deems just and proper.
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